Abstract The United States and its closest allies now spend over $100 billion a year on intelligence. Ten years after 9/11, the intelligence machine is certainly biggerbut not necessarily better. American intelligence continues to privilege oldfashioned strategic analysis for policy-makers and exhibits a technocratic approach to asymmetric security threats, epitomized by the accelerated use of drone strikes and data-mining. Distinguished commentators have focused on the panacea of top-down reform, while politicians and practitioners have created entire new agencies. However these prescriptions for change remain conceptually limited because of underlying Anglo-Saxon presumptions about what intelligence is. Although intelligence is a global business, when we talk about intelligence we tend to use a vocabulary that is narrowly derived from the experiences of America and its English-speaking nebula. This article deploys the notion of strategic culture to explain this why this is. It then explores the cases of China and South Africa to suggest how we might begin to rethink our intelligence communities and their tasks. It argues that the road to success is about individuals, attitudes and cultures rather than organizations. Future improvement will depend on our ability to recognize the changing nature of the security environment and to practice the art of 'intelligence among the people'. While the United States remains the world's most significant military power, its strategic culture is unsuited to this new terrain and arguably other countries do these things rather better.
3 that we operate in remains one attuned to the support to high policy. Certainly there is still a place for strategic intelligence analysis. However, even here, new security challengers predominate, including migration, pandemics, energy security and global financial instability. Some are asking whether think tanks, private sector intelligence providers, or academics would not do this work just as well at a lower cost.
In the real world, four modes of intelligence now predominate. None of them are about strategic intelligence. The lead activity is a kind of globalised counterterrorism enforcement operation which involves elaborate co-operation with new partners -mostly the internal security agencies of small states in the global south.
This includes the vast effort being poured into security sector reform to boost the capabilities of friends and allies overseas. This activity is largely operational and has called into question both the traditional intelligence cycle and the division between foreign and domestic intelligence activity. Not far behind is intelligence support on the ground for major wars in Iraq, Afghanistan -and more recently Somalia and Libya -which has increasingly seen national intelligence assets deployed to support tactical activities. A third area is covert action and disruption, something which the UK's Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) politely calls 'event-shaping'. Finally, we have a resurgence of counter-intelligence against state-based opponents, both on the street and in cyber-space. Yet our current notions of intelligence are not attuned to these sorts of activities and their discussion induces at best a degree of confusion and at worst a degree of moral panic. Arguably, other states handle these things more elegantly. 4 The predominance of American approaches in international security more generally has been widely discussed, and in some quarters much lamented. In reality, this state of affairs is hardly surprising, given the genealogical inter-play of writing on international security with the complexities of nuclear strategy during the first three decades of the Cold War.
9 By contrast, the predominance of the American paradigm in the field of intelligence is more of a puzzle, given that most states in the world have a substantial tradition of intelligence and internal security organisations, or else clandestine activity. Even Iceland, with a population of just 316,000, has an intelligence service. Moreover, many non-state entities, including banks, oil companies and terrorist organisations have long maintained significant intelligence capabilities. Given that intelligence entities are so ubiquitous, the conundrum is why the conceptualisation of intelligence remains narrowly derived from the experiences of the United States, the UK and some their closest collaborators -often referred to as the "UKUSA" partners or the "Five Eyes" alliance. 10 In this essay we ask, what are the causes and consequences of this persistent Anglo-Saxon myopia? Moreover, would a more global approach allow us to escape Anglosphere and to realise the true potential of intelligence?
Michael Herman was the first to reflect on "Anglo-Saxon" intelligence. In a landmark study facilitated by Chatham House, he noted that only Anglo-Saxon countries have used the term "intelligence community" and so the very idea is synonymous with a Western outlook. Herman has observed that there is a particular mentality that accompanies Anglo-Saxon approaches, including the development of a national estimative process and the concept of conducting strategic assessments of countries as a whole. 11 Thus the English-speaking world shares 'common dynamics and problems' and while there are clear differences between London and Washington, nevertheless the production of highly refined intelligence briefs for policy is paramount. In both communities 'word-smithing ... ranks high in the intelligence culture '. 12 This essay contends that we are increasingly constrained by an ethnocentric conception of intelligence that is predominantly Anglo-Saxon. 13 Moreover, this concept bears little relationship to mainstream intelligence activity around the world. how Moscow thought about nuclear weapons, he suggested that we might consider how the total sum of ideas, conditioned behaviours and historic patterns of thought affected a national strategic community. The implication was that a nation's sense of its own politico-military experience over time was important. For Snyder, strategic culture also conjured up the dangers of ethnocentrism -a feeling of 'group centrality and superiority' that contributed to a lack of intellectual challenge and which could potentially result in imprisonment inside ones own culture. 26 Despite these intriguing ruminations, Snyder eventually came to cast doubt on the value of cultural explanations, insisting that cause and effect were so distant that it would be difficult
for political scientists to demonstrate any linkage in a rigorous way.
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Ken Booth was less anxious about deploying strategic culture. 28 In a classic monograph penned in 1979, he related both strategic culture and ethnocentrism to the problem of 'groupthink' with its subliminal tendencies towards bureaucratic consensus. He argued that while ethnocentrism does not automatically lead to groupthink, it increases the likelihood that groupthink will occur, with the desire for consensus overriding realistic appraisals of alternative ideas and courses of action. 29 Booth asserts that ethnocentrism and groupthink work in tandem to produce stereotyped images of the 'outgroups' and a tendency for collective judgements to be self-confirming and therefore riskier than would otherwise be the case. 30 Intriguingly, 8 although much of what Booth argued had an obvious importance for intelligence analysis and strategic assessments, the thrust of the debate over culture in international security has ignored intelligence and has instead focused on action and reaction cycles. Typically, Colin Gray describes strategic culture as modes of thought that relate to behavioural patterns with respect to the use of force which derive from national historical experience. 31 Accordingly, these notions have become caught up in a complex methodological debate about how far it is possible to use the concept in the context of strategy. 32 Booth was actually deploying the notion of intelligence and culture in two senses, one of them specific and one of them more general. In the specific sense, some of these issues about the impact of culture upon perception had already been raised by figures such as Robert Jervis. 33 Indeed, as early as 1973, Antony Marc Lewis, who had run a foreign area studies programme within the CIA, argued that internal
Vietnam War case-studies showed conclusively that 'hidden cultural assumptions crippled the CIA's ability to perform its advisory functions'. 34 Over the next decade, the revered area studies specialist Adda Bozeman became an evangelist for 'cultural understanding' as a prerequisite for both improved net assessment and for strategic thinking. 35 Bozeman also argued that shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behaviour, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives and historical traditions influence collective decisions in the security realm. 36 Since then, numerous in-service training programmes for intelligence analysts have sought to address the problem of cultural confinement. 37 The importance of cultural awareness and "tribal" intelligence has also been periodically rediscovered in the context of counterinsurgency, although academic anthropologists are understandably unnerved by the eager embrace of the intelligence community. 38 Importantly, Booth was also using the idea of strategic culture in a more general sense to capture the idea of a world-view. What we might call a fundamental cognitive orientation. Culture constrains how we think our intelligence institutions relate to a globalising world, what tasks they should perform and what we think intelligence might be. 39 In this wider sense, we are all potentially prisoners of the ethnocentric dungeon. Moreover, while there is an emerging consensus that we need to take account of culture in the study of national security policy, it has not yet impacted upon realm of national intelligence communities. 40 Conversely, we might ask, can we Philip Davies is one of the few academics who have deployed the idea of culture in the context of intelligence, comparing the British and American analytic systems. 41 Arguably, the idea of culture has the potential to take us further in the realm of intelligence, explaining the role of institutionalised norms and values that countries associate with their intelligence communities, together with their place in the national psyche. 42 Escaping the cycle of pessimism, can we perhaps become conscious and strategic users of culture to achieve our intelligence goals.
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The predominance of American intelligence culture Estimates system. 46 As early as 1958, the United States could claim four sophisticated texts on national intelligence estimates, while the rest of the world had produced almost nothing. 47 No less important to America's dominance of the idea of intelligence has been a remarkably open attitude to secrecy. Alongside a vigorous intellectual interest in intelligence, we have also witnessed a unique American public debate about the place of intelligence in American foreign policy, stretching over more than half a century.
All this reflected the First Amendment of the US Constitution which, despite significant caveats, has facilitated a uniquely open approach to the discussion of intelligence in the American broadsheet press. This applies not only to intelligence, but other security subjects which many states regard as taboo. It remains unusual unheard of for US journalists to face legal action for writing about intelligence and it remains easier for most foreign journalists to cover US intelligence than to discuss the secret agencies of their own country. the United States, secret activity is often a public symbol of prevailing attitudes to American involvement in world affairs. Typically, when Ronald Reagan was campaigning for office, one of his high-profile election promises was to 'unleash the CIA'. 49 In short, the very idea of an intelligence agency, and of the CIA in particular, has gradually become symbolic of wider issues in American national security in a way that is quite different from other countries.
50
The American intelligence community has responded to revelation with counter-revelation. Acerbic public criticism of intelligence -and of covert action in particular -has prompted a forward strategy of public engagement by the American authorities in an effort to explain their activities. As early as the 1980s, the CIA began to promote 'Intelligence Studies' as an academic discipline by sponsoring conferences, promoting university teaching of the subject and declassifying documents for scholars as part of deliberate effort to aid public understanding. The CIA now hosts a respected Center for the Study of Intelligence and publishes a journal that scholars are pleased to be published in. Remarkably, the CIA has made some four million declassified documents available on an open access database at the US National Archives. As a result of this relative openness to intellectual inquiry, scholars in other countries have often chosen to study the US intelligence community in preference to their own. Accordingly, the intelligence community of United States, together with its immediate allies, boasts a public profile and an accompanying literature that has no parallel in terms of its scale or depth. 51 The effort made by the American intelligence community in the realm of public understanding can only be welcomed and has helped to spawn an academic industry with its own conferences, journals and degree courses. The UK intelligence community has begun to follow in its wake. Yet this also has its downside. It has also had the unintentional effect of promoting a monoculture in which -just as Snyder and This is a long term trend in Chinese foreign policy, currently reflected in the way that foreign policy think tanks have come to play an increasing role not only in policy making but also in intelligence analysis. 54 The boundary between centres of intelligence analysis and think tanks in China's cyber-espionage programme certainly has a strategic purpose, but it is not "strategic intelligence" as we understand it. In a recent hearing of the House Judiciary Committee, FBI Director, Robert S. Mueller, stated that: 'China is stealing our secrets in an effort to leap ahead in terms of its military technology, but also the economic capability of China. It is substantial threat.' By mining vast amounts of public data and accumulating information a drop at a time, even the West's secret programmes can be mapped in outline. The Chinese intelligence philosophy that underpins this approach emphasises that: 'There are no walls that completely block the wind'. 61 Once access to computer networks has been gained, the hackers often implant software that logs keystrokes or else control programs which will permit access to further information. One of the most recent waves of computer attacks to be analysed is known as "Ghost Net" and has included the recording of sound and video over embedded microphones and webcams. "Ghost Net" successfully accessed some State Department computers. Nevertheless, the primary purpose of Chinese intelligence remains the acceleration of economic growth, rather than classical interstate espionage. Their intelligence targets are focused on a long term-goal pursued over decades and is designed to exploit fundamental weaknesses in the security infrastructures of the West. 62 Meanwhile, China attaches a high priority to its own information securityindeed its cryptographic security is famously difficult to penetrate. Beijing has poured resources into counter-intelligence -a field which the West has sorely neglected since 2001. China probably spends more money on internal security than external security and while some would see this as oppressive, the Chinese would argue that this is less provocative than a pre-emptive strategy that seeks to address threats beyond her borders. 63 It is also worth noting that the conception of human security in Chinese translates not as "ren de anquan" or the security of the individual human being, but as "renlei de anquan" or the security of humankind. The collective idea of the group interest being more important than the individual is significant, not least because it is suggestive of China's recent history as a constitutive part of its strategic culture. 64 China's own internal security policy is changing. Over several decades it has moved from a strategy of widespread security prosecutions to one of deterrence, with less than 0.5% of court actions now focusing upon counter-revolutionary activity. States to reappraise how it conducts intelligence business across a vast swathe of the global south. 72 If we are indeed entering a new period of democratic transitions it is worth considering some of the recent unsung successes of intelligence and security sector reform. Although the public tend to perceive intelligence in these countries through the one-dimensional prism of press stories about general thuggery, in reality, there have also been some substantive achievements here. The West has exported good governance to countries as afar afield as Romania and Indonesia, not just in the narrow area of intelligence oversight, but also in the wider domain of security practices, resilience and counter-terrorism legislation. Arguably this should be a twoway street and there are things that we might consider importing from countries that boast radically different intelligence cultures. 73 The South African intelligence story is redolent with references to culture. In the 1990s the post-apartheid government declared that change was 'not only a matter of organisational restructuring' it was instead about seeking to 'establish a new culture of intelligence' indeed even a new 'philosophy of intelligence'. 74 Moreover, it tells us much about the perils and promise of intelligence during democratic transitions. Transitions are periods of fragility and often require an increased rather than reduced intelligence capacity, yet this must be reconciled with democratic oversight, public confidence and an anticipation that intelligence should now support the rule of law. In the 1990s, the narrow state security focus of South African intelligence was broadened to encompass criminal targets as a result of concerns about poverty, unequal distribution of resources and even unemployment. Indeed, some African states have proved to be admirably creative in re-defining the mission of intelligence communities in socio-economic terms in the expectation that helping to support human security will help to rehabilitate these services whose past reputations were less than enviable. This was a conscious change of style in the direction of community ownership and has delivered some successes. 75 Intelligence services in emerging democracies certainly require clear mandates provided by legislation, central co-ordination, together with both judicial oversight and parliamentary accountability. However, in transitional or fragile states these mechanisms are often imperfect and need to work in tandem with a free press, civil society and traditional community networks to provide checks and balances. 76 Increasingly, informal mechanisms operate as the cutting edge of intelligence oversight, with the more formal mechanisms tending to follow along in their wake examining abuses uncovered by others. As such, intelligence and security sector reform in itself is unlikely to work without the wider context of democratic transition.
Equally, major structural change represents the best opportunities for intelligence reform and for seeking to combine intelligence effectiveness with new conventions focused on ethical behaviour. David Omand has emphasized the importance of achieving public confidence in the intelligence community in a world of increasing respect for human rights and concern for personal privacy. Arguably these problems should be taken, not as evidence of failure, but instead as a signal that a local form of constitutionalism is working and evolving. 78 South Africa is often held up as an example of the application of external models of intelligence accountability drawn from the Anglosphere. In fact, sensitivity to local requirements has been combined with selective policy transfer in the area of oversight and accountability, producing a hybrid model that is locally grounded and yet aspires to meet international expectations and norms. 79 Intelligence oversight in South Africa incorporates both formal and informal mechanisms, creating a robust system that has served as a reference point for other the countries in the region as they have puzzled over matters of democratic governance and international intelligence cooperation. What we seeing emerging in Sub-Saharan Africa is not just a middle way but genuine hybridity. Laurie Nathan has rightly criticised the polarised debate over the nature of the relationship between the constitution and the intelligence services, a battle between "intelligence exceptionalism" and "strict constitutionalism". It is obvious that during a democratic transition effectiveness will be measured in terms of adherence to democratic principles, practices and ideals, but it should also be born in mind that there are alternative roads to be followed by countries when moving towards good governance and democracy. What is acceptable operationally and the parameters in which intelligence services are allowed to operate are a product of values, beliefs and interests of the society in which they operate. 83 Security sector reform is often viewed as part of state-building by the international community, a kind of externally-driven social engineering project.
Instead we need to view transitional states as hybrid political orders with the potential to generate new options for security. The set of expectations placed on formal constitutional mechanisms for intelligence accountability in developing countries is probably is too great at present, while community values such as trust are undervalued. Moreover, wholesale introduction of external systems risks losing the vernacular approaches that deliver the most effective routes to 'intelligence amongst the people'. We need to combine state mechanisms, customary institutions together with new elements of citizenship and civil society in networks of security which are embedded in local societal structures. 84 It has been suggested that we are moving towards "postmodern intelligence", but a case might also be advanced for the postcolonial intelligence. 85 Such a model might offer genuine hybridity, challenging
Western ways of thinking, delivering good governance but also strong regime security at a time of state fragility. Culture is partly about difference and each intelligence community has its own unique interface with national strategy. Appreciating the importance of associated norms and values is central to understanding how they function. Bourdieu also points out that the paradox of globalization is at the core of so many of these concerns. 95 Why, he asks, has the nation-state been so keen to accelerate processes which are detrimental to state sovereignty? In the realm of intelligence and security this has manifested itself most clearly in the corrosion of the Anglospheric distinction between foreign intelligence services that observe things abroad and domestic security services which watch people at home. The collapse of this Westphalian boundary between foreign and domestic intelligence -and the need for close co-operation on transnational targets -is a further reason to prioritise intelligence multiculturalism. Globalization prompts us to export out belief in civil society, but we must also be prepared to learn afresh about how to conduct intelligence amongst the people.
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Can we escape from the Anglosphere? Change and improvement is not impossible. The South African story -a narrative of hybridity -shows us that intelligence cultures are far from immutable. It also suggests that challenging security situations can be addressed by intelligence and security services without the abandonment of our core values. However, first of all we will need to know more about how others think about intelligence and we will then need to rethink our own assumptions about what intelligence ought to be. We should not expect instant results.
Precisely because our habits of thought about the nature of intelligence are culturally determined they are deeply engrained and hard to challenge. It is unlikely that the United States and its Anglo-Saxon allies will learn to think differently about intelligence in the short term, partly because our agencies tend to be cautious and conservative. Meanwhile we will continue to live within a set of alternatives and analogies mostly drawn from our own experiences. Garret Jones, a long-serving CIA intelligence officer, has put this rather well: 'If you liked the past, you are going to love the future. 
